Matthew Jill
One Small Step: The Past, Present, and Future of the Federal Sentencing System
The federal sentencing guidelines, which focus on offense based statistical consistency,
had a ripple effect that molded the entire federal sentencing system in it’s wake; this
article is an individual case study demonstrating the flaws of a consistency based
sentencing system, the injustice such a system can create, and why United States v.
Booker is only the first step in creating a fair and effective sentencing system.
I. Introduction
Theoretical viewpoints as to the purpose and methods of punishment have been a
thread in the fabric of the American justice system since its inception. Over the past
several decades there has been a push, largely by conservative groups and lawmakers, for
consistency and severity in sentencing. I argue that although statistical consistency is an
element of fairness in theory, the multitude of differences in every human being, every
circumstance, and every incidence of crime, makes true consistency in sentencing nearly
impossible. Focusing predominantly on consistency as a sentencing theory is contrary to
the most important factor of criminal sentencing, assuring that each individual convicted
of a crime receives the sentence he or she actually deserves. Matching actual culpability
to the sentence imposed will never be a perfect science, but given our societal practice of
treating humans as individuals, the goal of sentencing should be to get as close a match as
possible. With this paper I demonstrate the flaws in the consistency approach through a
case study of a current Federal prisoner.
In order to reach the level of consistency lauded by conservatives as necessary,
the techniques employed in a new Federal sentencing system would likely have to mirror
those in the old system in several key ways. The purpose of this paper is to establish the
flaws in such an approach. Part I is an overview of the background of the push for
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consistency in sentencing and also introduces the case that will be individually studied.
Part II addresses four aspects of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that have often been
criticized and that provide substantial evidence of the injustice that can result from a goal
as restrictive as statistical consistency in sentencing. The areas of concern are the
complexity necessary for consistency, the rigidity necessary to deter discretion, the
procedural injustices of real offense sentencing, and the change in role of the parties
involved in the sentencing process. Each section is preceded by narrative looks into how
these aspects directly affected our individual case study. Part III addresses the
fundamental issue of the meaning of consistency and why statistical consistency is an
inappropriate measure for sentencing. Part IV focuses briefly on ideas for the future
including parole, less complicated guidelines, alternative forms of punishment, and the
elimination of mandatory minimum sentences.
I. Background – A Great Idea
When Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 19841 the vision was of
“an interactive guidelines process involving federal judges, the Department of Justice, the
Probation System, the Bureau of Prisons, and the Federal Public Defenders.”2 These
systems would work together using the wealth of statistical and anecdotal data available
in order to create an enlightened system that would develop and grow over time.3
Lawmakers, scholars and the judiciary were calling for sentencing reform and for a
sentencing scheme that better reflected the various purposes of punishment.4 There was
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distaste with judges basing sentences on factors determined individually and that were
reflective of irrelevant socioeconomic characteristics such as race and income.5 There
was also fear that judicial use of a seemingly endless number of factors was leading to
inconsistent sentencing in similar cases.6 Statistics showed different sentences for similar
crimes, but research into the roots of the differences was insufficient, in fact most judges
attributed the differences to circumstantial factors and not judicial discretion.7 So began
the obsession with consistency in sentencing to the detriment of all other related factors.
In the creation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,8 the focus was on standardization of
the law of sentencing, most of the effort in creation of the Guidelines went to assigning
fixed ranges of punishment for every crime, with fixed value and process for taking into
account any surrounding circumstances.9 “Important questions like burdens of proof,
hearing procedures, and fact-finding procedures were left to the implementation of
individual judges.”10 In addition, a multitude of equally important factors in punishment
including rehabilitation, age, education, vocational skills, mental condition, family
circumstances, and many others were deemed irrelevant.11 What was most disturbing
about the change in thought process which led to the Guidelines was that the change was
not based on the fundamental concepts of fairness as initially conceived but was heavily
influenced by republican political agendas such as the war on drugs, law and order, and
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severity of punishments.12 Although the Booker13 decision made the Guidelines
advisory, they are still to be used as the model of sentencing in this country and thus
remain a prime example of the injustice that results from focusing on empirical
consistency.
From the outset, the Guidelines were criticized for their complexity, rigidity,
procedural and substantive unfairness, and their severity.14 In addition “any marginal
reduction in disparity that has come from the complexity and rigidity of the system has
been more than offset by unwarranted uniformity.”15 Although the concept of sentencing
guidelines could have brought organization to a very unstable and varied system, in
practice there was significant injustice. This injustice came to the forefront in the recent
Supreme Court decisions of Apprendi v. New Jersey16, Blakely v. Washington17, and
United States v. Booker.18 Collectively these cases established the unconstitutionality of
the guidelines and rendered them advisory.19 In the wake of Booker, Blakely, and
Apprendi the public is now witness to the injustices of the federal sentencing guidelines,
and is also presented with opportunities for improving sentencing in the future. There
continues, however, to be a conservative push for statistical outcome consistency through
measures such as mandatory minimum sentencing and topless sentencing ranges.20 The
next several years will present our legislature and courts with many important questions
and with these questions opportunities to develop sentencing regulation that accurately
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reflects the crimes committed, is fair and flexible, yet lacks unexplainable disparities.
This article explores the experiences of a federal prisoner and demonstrates the flaws in a
rigid statistically based system.
A. Case Study: Roberto Natale
Statistics on the merits or injustice of a sentencing scheme based on statistical
consistency are available and often presented, supporting both sides of the equation. In
spite of all of the proclaimed benefits of such a rigid system, I present a case that proves
otherwise, a case that shows not only how the entire sentencing process has been molded
in the wake of the guidelines, but also how a statistical consistency based system in fact
produces punishments unrelated to culpability. This is not a case study of a fringe case or
the outlying example of injustice, but a common case with few exceptional
circumstances. This case shows that under such a system, the actual crime committed
and the rehabilitation and punishment for the crime are only minor factors in the
sentencing analysis. Mr. Roberto Natale is a tragic and dramatic example of an offender
falling prey to our sentencing system. A first time offender, Mr. Natale received 19 years
of prison time21, although it is clear that much of his time in prison had very little to do
with his convicted crimes. From the onset of his sentencing it was clear the proceeding
had little to do with sentencing Natale as an individual and everything to do with
application of the guidelines. We enter a world where sentencing is reduced to issues of
whether or not the guidelines apply, interpretation of the guidelines, and relevant conduct
under the guidelines – issues that made up nearly ninety percent of Natale’s sentencing
hearing.
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Roberto Natale, federal inmate number 29947-004, was born in Casolla Caserta
Italy on June 18th 1943.22 Mr. Natale’s family was devastatingly poor and he and his
brothers migrated to the United States in 1967 in search of a better life.23 Mr. Natale was
physically and mentally abused as a child, and in general had a very tough upbringing.24
Natale had a fifth grade education and had an ongoing battle with substance abuse.25
Unable to read, write, or speak English, Natale went from business to business begging
for cleaning jobs, often times being turned away as a result of his inability to
communicate.26 After years of hard work Natale scraped together the income necessary
to open his own business. Capitalizing on his knowledge of foreign cars he and his
brother opened a garage that specialized in repairing these vehicles, but life was still a
struggle.27 At some point a regular customer at his garage, Bruno Sorrocco, pulled Mr.
Natale into a scheme that would change the rest of his life. Sorrocco was the head of an
international drug dealing operation that was very large in its reach, operating from 1979
to 1988.28 Natale allegedly becomes a part of the conspiracy from 1985-1986.29 Natale
was never caught in commission of a crime nor was he arrested while in possession of
illegal narcotics.30 All of the charges were based on testimony of government informants
who claim witness to the acts some ten years prior to the trial and themselves were drug
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dealers who were given deals for their assistance.31 Natale was convicted of conspiracy
to distribute cocaine as part of the operation and for 3 counts of possession with intent to
distribute.32
II. Learning from Past Mistakes: The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
It is a daunting task; confining every federal crime, every circumstance, and
every judicial mind interpreting these factors within a rigid framework. In practice, it
makes sense only in the extreme fringes of abstract thinking. For example, at first glance,
it makes sense that two individuals, A and B, convicted of trafficking 10 kilograms of
cocaine should receive the same sentence regardless of where they are sentenced. But the
error of this thinking is immediately apparent; it is based on the least information possible
for each crime, the nature of the crime and the amount of the drug. It logically follows
that the more information one has about each crime and each defendant, the more
distinguishable each case becomes. For example, A is a 45 year old lawyer that uses his
wife’s daycare business as a front for his cocaine trade, while B is twenty years old, was
a part of the child welfare system all his life, has 2 children to support, and has only an
eighth grade education. The crime is the same, but do they really deserve the same
sentence? I think not. Although the offense category may be the same, each of these
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individuals would benefit from a sentence tailored to their circumstances. The desire for
statistical consistency in sentencing has come hand in hand with a desire for rigidity, both
factors raising many questions as to their effects on fairness, culpability, and the true goal
of sentencing. Although consistency, and alternatively, disparity in federal sentencing is
one factor in appropriate federal punishment, there are many other factors that are
seemingly ignored. Most important is the fact that many offenders, although categorically
similar, actually should receive different sentences.
Although the guidelines are now advisory under Booker, judges are still required
to use the guidelines reasonably and explain any actions taken in contravention to them.33
There remains a strong requirement to justify sentences that are not in accordance with
the guidelines.34 What the Booker decision fails to address is the reality that the entire
sentencing system and related processes have been molded around the complexity of the
guidelines making sentencing a very mechanical process based largely on guideline
interpretation.35 Those who are not directly involved in the process often have difficulty
comprehending the rigid disregard of important factors, the complexity of the process,
and the bizarre results.36 Equally as important, the guidelines have caused the roles of
prosecutors, defense attorneys, probation officers, to change dramatically.37 The
following views each of these factors individually through the eyes of Roberto Natale and
demonstrates that Booker alone is not enough to fix the problems created by the
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Guidelines. These problems also demonstrate that in the future we must move away from
statistical consistency as the basis for our sentencing system.
A. The More You Know, the Harder It Gets – A Rigid System
Roberto Natale had a clean record prior to these convictions, he was not a career
criminal.38 Natale was not violent during his alleged crimes or upon being taken into
custody.39 Natale kept no weapons and was not associated with any violent men or
involved in any violent events.40 The last action he made in furtherance of the drug
conspiracy occurred ten years before he was sentenced, and he had been out of the
“business” for nearly that entire time.41 Natale was fifty four years old at the time of his
sentencing and faced confinement into his seventies.42 Mr. Natale was considered a good
person by his family and his community and was hardly a threat at his age. 43 Mr. Natale
was living a modest life, rebuilding a relationship with his sons.44 Mr. Natale lived a
very hard and impoverished life, was abused mentally and physically as a child, and had
only a fifth grade education.45 Mr. Natale was battling with a substance abuse problem at
the time of his arrest.46 These factors are important, and some could say essential to
punishing and rehabilitating a person convicted of crime. However, not one of these
factors was taken into consideration in Natale’s sentencing. Even if the judge were
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lenient and decided to consider that Natale was almost entirely rehabilitated at the time of
sentencing, the guidelines required Natale to be sentenced between 17.5-21.5 years.47
Not only was the sentencing judge prohibited from considering a multitude of factors
seemingly essential to proper punishment, but the guidelines constrained him to move
only 20% from the maximum sentence. Natale’s circumstances are common, and often
times even more dramatic.
“Before we had the guidelines, one could express his true feelings. You looked at
the individual, his background, his prior record, his family and all that, and you
presented those facts to the judge, and the judge had to agonize over what
sentence was appropriate for that individual. Now, we have to apply the
guidelines not to that person, but to that crime.”48
One of the most perplexing aspects of the guidelines is the declaration that many
personal characteristics of offenders are not relevant to sentencing outside of the
applicable range.49 Congressional mandate established that factors such as education,
vocational skills, employment, family responsibilities, community ties, age, mental and
emotional condition, drug dependence, and dependence on crime for a livelihood were
generally inappropriate factors.50 When the sentencing commission decided to make
consistent outcomes its primary objective, it had little choice but to deem personal
characteristics irrelevant because in order to categorize the actions of a seemingly endless
number of defendants, one must rely on the least information impossible.51 The more
factors taken into consideration in sentencing, the harder it is to fit crimes into neat
categories; thus any increase in statistical consistency comes at the expense of the
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consideration of relevant information.52 Ironically, when fewer factors are taken into
consideration, the less likely it is that the sentence will match the crime.53 As a result of
the level of generality needed “[t]he guidelines largely ignore culpability by rejecting
factors such as youth that judges have traditionally relied on to mitigate punishment.”54
It defies logic to rely on mechanical scoring systems, rather than by looking at the
circumstances of individual cases.55 In fact, several studies have shown that the more
detailed information people are given about specific cases, the less rigid and harsh the
punishments become.56 The commission erred by trying to force the wide range of
human “characters and actions into an overly engineered structure” because judges
sentence more effectively if they are permitted to use all of the relevant information.57
Another flaw of such an impersonal system as evidenced by Mr. Natale’s
circumstances is that it completely disregards rehabilitation. Although we are clearly in
an age of retributive punishment,58 rehabilitation is still a major part of state systems and
of the public conscious as can be evidenced through the growth of such programs as drug
courts and group homes.59 Our present system of federal guidelines, and any system
rigidly centered on statistical consistency, runs afoul to the idea of rehabilitation as such
programs have to be targeted to characteristics and needs of each offender thus requiring
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individual sentencing.60 Rigid systems that ignore individual offender characteristics are
a large obstacle to the concept of rehabilitation of criminals.61
In the wake of Booker, the Guidelines stay intact as does the culture surrounding
them and relevant information will continue to be ignored. To say that even though Mr.
Natale had not committed any action in furtherance of the conspiracy for which he was
convicted in over ten years was not a factor seems absolutely ridiculous. It is also
illogical to ignore the fact that Natale will be seventy-two when he is released, costing the
prison system thousands each year given the health issues of a man of such an advanced
age. Ignoring these factors misses the connection between the individual and the crime
and focuses purely on the crime. A system that ignores factors such as education,
vocational skills, employment, family responsibilities, community ties, age, mental and
emotional condition, drug dependence, and dependence on crime for a livelihood is
barbaric in nature and far from the enlightened system that was imagined when the idea
of sentencing reform sprouted in the academic community. Sentencing based purely on
statistical consistency offends the basic principles of our government and constitution the recognition of individual liberty. We must return to a system that examines offenders
as individuals taking into account the unique characteristics of each person and
circumstances surrounding their crimes.
B. Consistency Leads to Complexity
The Guidelines combated judicial discretion by severely restricting the ability of
judges to consider the characteristics of each offender through the use of an immensely
complex, narrowly tailored, restrictive system. The extent to which the sentencing
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process has been molded around the guidelines and their complexity can be evidenced by
Mr. Natale’s sentencing hearing. From the beginning of his sentencing transcript it was
clear that culpability for the actual crime for which Natale was convicted was only a
small portion of the proceeding, and in fact was rarely mentioned. On Mr. Natale’s day
of sentencing, the nature of the proceeding was unclear - sentencing or guideline
interpretation. The sentencing judge divided the hearing into two sections, guideline
issues and traditional sentencing.62 Stating the traditional sentencing process, actually
applying the convicted crime to a prison term, would come only after interpreting and
clarifying all of the guideline issues.63 The first seventy nine pages of Natale’s ninety one
page sentencing transcript were dedicated to guideline issues; 87% of the entire
sentencing hearing.64 In addition, during the hearing, the sentencing judge made
numerous mistakes, these mistakes were corrected, but only after being called to his
attention by the prosecution and probation officers.65 The judge appeared to be little
more than a puppet through which the prosecutor and probation officer worked the
guidelines. The time spent analyzing Natale individually, his crime, and his culpability,
amounted to only a few pages devoid of any meaningful analysis.66 Further, the analysis
and reasoning provided by the court had almost nothing to do with Natale as an
62
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individual or criminal, but centered on the ripple effect of the drug trade and how this
effect relates to the congressional reasoning behind the sentencing guidelines.67
One of the major fears of conservatives leading into the promulgation of the
sentencing guidelines was that liberal judges were imposing lenient sentences based on
individual factors.68 This was believed to be the most significant reason for disparity in
federal sentencing.69 The Guidelines combated judicial discretion by severely restricting
the ability of judges to consider the characteristics of each offender through the use of an
immensely complex, narrowly tailored, restrictive system.70 Technically, this meant that
at each level of sentencing, the high end of the range could not be more than twenty-five
percent higher than the low end of the range.71 As a result of such a restrictive number,
the guidelines had an inordinate number of ranges, forty three to be exact, and too little
room to differentiate between offenders with similar offenses and very different
circumstances.72 “The degree of complexity is famously depicted by the 258 box
sentencing grid.”73 The guidelines are so complex that they require “a 629-page
guidelines manual with 1100 pages of appendices and more legalisms than Jarndyce v.
Jarndyce.”74 On a practical level, it makes sense that an attempt to categorize a
seemingly endless array of possible circumstances so as to curtail discretion would
require an enormous rule structure. This level of complexity requires judges to plow
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through an immense number of rules, which can divert the purpose of the sentencing
hearing from a matching of culpability and punishment to a rule interpretation hearing.
Complex guidelines push judges to spending most of their time deciding procedural
guideline issues and increasingly less time determining what the sentence should actually
be.75
What does all of this mean? Given the fact that judges must still calculate and
consider the guidelines in sentencing even after Booker, the flaws evidenced by Mr.
Natale’s hearing are likely to continue.76 For a convicted prisoner, the sentencing hearing
is perhaps the second most important proceeding, behind the actual trial. One would
think that an event of such magnitude should be a detailed yet thoughtful analysis by the
judge, with input from counsel analyzing the life of the defendant, the factors leading to
his crimes, what will best punish and rehabilitate him, and a decision which expresses the
best efforts of all of the parties to give an appropriate sentence. Unfortunately, the
complexity of the guidelines does not allow this. In fact, the entire sentencing hearing
degenerates into a messy attempt at the correct interpretation of the guidelines, which
none of the involved parties can do accurately, with the one person who should be the
most knowledgeable, the judge, basically at the mercy of the prosecutors and probation
officers. An event so important to the liberty of the defendant and to the policy goals of
the federal government should not be relegated to a guessing game with all of the parties
pouring through pages of an instruction manual. It should be a delicate balancing of
factors as found at trial, and presented by the defendant as to his actual culpability. The
inadequate time dedicated to Mr. Natale in this respect was an insult to his liberty as an
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American, and an insult to every defendant that passes through the sentencing process.
Because of the reverberations the Guidelines have had on the sentencing system, the
entire sentencing process must be revamped in order to correct the flaws resulting from
the guidelines that have now saturated the sentencing system.
C. Relevant Conduct – Real Offense Sentencing
Perhaps the most unjust aspect of the Guidelines are the relevant conduct
provisions requiring judges to increase sentences based on offenses for which the
defendant was not convicted, and may have in fact been acquitted.77 Entering the
sentencing hearing, Mr. Natale was looking at a sentencing level of 31; he had no
criminal history points and was the prototypical safety valve defendant.78 Given this
level, his sentencing range would be 108-135 months, or a maximum of 11 years.79 The
government proceeded to introduce a multitude of hearsay evidence in order to establish
that Natale was more than a minor player in the conspiracy.80 But nearly all of the
evidence focused not on the defendant, but on the actions of his co-defendant Mr.
Sorrocco. This hearsay evidence lead to Mr. Natale being found a manager and required
the judge to adjust Natale’s sentence upward significantly.81 Essentially, Natale was
sentenced for a crime the jury did not convict him of. There was no jury trial, no rules of
evidence, no cross examination on the issue of Natale’s role in the offense and in fact the
pre-sentence investigation stated Natale was not a manager. On the record, the judge
stated that had it not been for the manager status found at sentencing, Natale would have
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been given the safety valve, and then proceeded to increase his offense level to 37.82 This
new offense level carried a sentence range of 210-262 months and the defendant was
sentenced exactly in the middle of that range - 228 months.83 Natale was not convicted
of managing a drug conspiracy at trial and all of the evidence presented came from the
notes of the prosecution.84 In one flash of injustice Mr. Natale’s sentence was nearly
doubled.
Booker’s most beneficial outcome has likely been its effect on judicial fact
finding as required by the relevant conduct provisions of the Guidelines.85 Even so, the
real offense or relevant conduct aspects of the Guidelines remain very influential and the
culture that encourages real offense sentencing perseveres. Judges are still required to
calculate sentences as they had done before, and thus the Supreme Court has not yet
abolished the real offense sentencing at issue.86 “No other sentencing system in the
world mandates that sentences be increased based on alleged additional offenses for
which the defendant has not been convicted.”87 Every sentencing system in the United
States except the Federal system bases offense levels on charged crimes and not on
alleged ‘relevant conduct.’88 Many times this relevant conduct alone results in sentences
longer than the conduct charged.89 This is not a rare phenomenon, as data has shown that
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uncharged conduct increased sentences in over one half of cases.90 Not only do the
Guidelines actually promote sentencing increases based on conduct defendants were not
convicted of, often times the government takes advantage of the system by proving just
enough to get to sentencing.91 The government then relies on the lower burden of proof
to obtain a longer sentence based on conduct that could not be proven at trial or earlier.92
Relevant conduct often times does not even have to be formally charged and the
defendant is often not even informed that this information would or could be used in such
a manner.93 Relevant conduct evidence may be based on hearsay evidence, sometimes
even double and triple hearsay.94 Further, a federal appeals court held that “a district
judge may not refuse to consider relevant evidence at sentencing, even if that evidence
has been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”95 This kind of action not only
offends the constitution, but it encourages law enforcement to illegally obtain evidence
knowing it will be admissible at sentencing.96 In addition, studies show that challenges to
relevant conduct evidence sometimes lead to higher sentences based on findings that the
defendant did not accept responsibility.97
It is sometimes suggested that prior to the Guidelines, relevant conduct could be
taken into consideration by judges in sentencing and without any regulation. This
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argument fails for several reasons. First, judges were not required to charge the conduct
and to give the severe weights assigned by the guidelines.98 Conduct could be offset by
the ability of judges to look at a variety of other mitigating factors.99 In addition, back
end review through the parole system gave the defendant and the government a separate
opportunity to offset any such considerations at the front end of sentencing.100
The Booker decision rendered the guidelines advisory and does not require judges
to make non-jury factual findings.101 However, the relevant conduct aspects remain very
influential. Judges are still required to calculate the guidelines range as they had done in
the past and consider all the factors they previously had under the guidelines. The
Supreme Court did not abolish relevant conduct or real offense sentencing.102 And what
about Mr. Natale? Had this constitutional violation not occurred he would no longer be
in prison. Booker was not applied retroactively and in fact Mr. Natale was denied a resentencing hearing for this very reason.103 Natale is paying the price for an unjust system
and the unjust culture it has created. A clear constitutional violation resulting in nearly a
decade of imprisonment will go un-remedied. Not only must the sentencing commission
and congress eliminate real offense sentencing, there must be a just resolution to those
convicted based on constitutional violations. Every individual who has spent even one
additional day in prison due to a violation of his constitutional right deserves justice. If
not, the very fabric of our Constitution and our system of government will be offended.
D. A Tainted Culture
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Mr. Natale’s sentencing demonstrated an intangible change that resulted from the
Guidelines and which now reverberates through the entire Federal Court System. The
shift of power away from the judge and to the prosecutors and probation officers results
in further unfairness to defendants and their counsel.104 During Natale’s hearing it was
clear that the probation officer was the expert of the guidelines while any discretion in
sentencing was left for the prosecutors.105 In fact the judge conceded to the discretion of
the probation officer on several occasions.106 These concessions of discretion ranged
from whether to depart for higher or lower sentences to unfettered belief in investigations
that were based on evidence not found at trial.107 Even more dramatic is the amount of
power the prosecutors were given as they controlled the defendant’s sentence and the
general flow of the proceedings.108 The defense for Natale was at the complete mercy of
the prosecutor, to the point where the government controlled the defense’s right to object
to factual findings in the pre-sentence investigation.109 This all took place directly in
front of the judge, who failed to participate in any bargaining, although it was apparent
the government was in complete control of the proceedings.110 All of the evidence
104
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presented came from the notes of the prosecutors and the findings of the probation
officer, not from the trial holdings.111 Defense counsel was reduced to battling away at
powers unfairly waged against Mr. Natale and a system that is clearly advantageous to
the government.
The judicial discretion that many people claimed to be the cause of disparity in
sentencing prior to the guidelines was merely shifted to other parties, namely prosecutors
and probation officers.112 District court judges often depend on probation officers to
apply and interpret guidelines and even to resolve factual disputes.113 Probation officers
have been criticized for controlling or being guardians of guideline interpretation, and
their confidential suggested sentence is often taken as law.114 The version of the facts set
forth in the pre-sentence investigation and the probation officers calculation of the
sentencing range is usually just accepted by the court without question.115 The probation
officers suggestions are accepted even though they often do not attend the trial.116 Even
more alarming is that the government’s files and statements constitute the primary source
of evidence used at sentencing, evidence that is often inadmissible at trial.117 Defense
attorneys have been reduced to government negotiators with their primary means of
accomplishing sentencing goals being conducted primarily through the government and
plea deals.118 “Although plea bargaining occurs everywhere, in the states with well-
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designed guidelines bargaining takes place in the shadow of the guidelines and has not
been characterized by widespread circumvention.”119
The Guidelines not only are unjust by the letter of the law, but intangible changes
in the power structure of the Federal Courtroom have pushed an even greater burden onto
defendants. Probation officers are responsible for the majority of the sentencing
interpretation while the government controls the proceedings through circumvention
techniques such as plea dealing away the defense’s right to object or appeal. The large
majority of information shared at sentencing comes from the notes of prosecutors and
probation officers and these parties together essentially decide the fate of the defendant.
The judge does little more than attempt to hold this complex process together and often
gets lost in the mass of rules surrounding what should be a procedurally simple
sentencing hearing. These power shifts have not been corrected by declaring the
Guidelines advisory. They can only be corrected by scrapping the foundation upon
which the system is built, and moving away from the empirical consistency based model.
III. Statistical Consistency Does Not Equal Fairness
Before his trial, Mr. Natale was offered a plea deal that would have resulted in
him receiving slightly less than six years in prison for a reduced charge. He opted to go
to trial and received nineteen years, which seems very inconsistent. Consider the person
who committed the same exact crime yet took the deal, now we have two identical
defendants receiving vastly different sentences. This is exactly the thing the guidelines
were said to be eliminating; disparities in sentences for like offenders. The reality is that
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this disparity has been shifted and hidden, and has arguably worsened given the fact that
96% of federal defendant’s opt for plea deals.120
The unfairness inherent in a system based purely on aggregate and statistical
consistency could possibly be justified if it actually resulted in the consistency that it was
designed to achieve. But our guidelines system has done nothing but shift and hide
disparity in sentencing, and the Booker decision has done nothing to address this
problem. Everything that we know about the use of statistical outcome based sentencing
systems has shown that they increase disparities.121 For example, A and B were both
caught sending 10 grams of cocaine through the mail. A takes a plea deal and is charged
with obstruction of justice, B goes to trial and is found guilty of both possession and mail
fraud. A and B are receiving different sentences for the same crime, disparity in its most
basic form. Real world examples are abundant, such as illegal aliens caught crossing the
Mexican border with fifty pounds of marijuana, being allowed to plea down to a charge
of illegal entry.122 Supporters of such a system often point to consistency in statistics
showing that all offenders convicted of a certain crime are within a certain guidelines
range, while, in reality, a large number of individuals that committed the same crime are
receiving different sentences. Dubbed by many as “new disparity”, disparity under the
guidelines is a function of intentional coercion of guilty pleas and the degree of disparity
is much greater than in the past.123 The disparity is now hidden through statistics that
rely on how often judges depart from the guidelines, and not on whether defendants who
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commit the same crimes are being sentenced similarly.124 Defendants arrested by the
same law enforcement officers for the same crimes receive widely different sentences
based on where they are prosecuted.125 “The simple point is that these guidelines have
not eliminated “disparities” and that no set of guidelines, no matter how faithfully
applied, can do so, so long as human beings—law enforcement agents, prosecutors,
probation officers, and judges—must make decisions affecting the liberty of other human
beings.”126 Increased disparity is not a hidden reality, it is clearly apparent to anyone
who digs only marginally into the meaning of consistency as related to our system, and it
begs the question, why would we want to continue to base our punishment system on
such a misleading concept?
Race disparity was another major factor in the implementation of the
Guidelines.127 In a study by Judge Heaney, pre-guidelines sentences were roughly
equivalent for all males in the eighteen to thirty-five age group, with two months
difference between time served for blacks and whites. But under the guidelines, blacks
served almost fifty percent more time then whites.128 In addition, the percentage of the
prison population that is black has continually increased since the implementation of the
guidelines.129
There is no disputing the reality that disparity in sentencing continues. Statistics
showing that judges sentence within a certain range for a certain crime a certain
percentage of the time mean next to nothing when judges are not sentencing for the actual
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crime committed. Disparity in sentencing continues, and it will always continue. The
discretion once held by judges is now shifted into the hands of prosecutors who make
deals in almost every case that comes before them. It seems to me that if anyone is going
to have discretion to make sentencing decisions, it should be judges and not prosecutors.
It begs the question, how can we accept the injustice resulting from the complexity and
rigidity of a system necessary for this alleged consistency, when consistency is not what
we are getting?
IV. What Does the Future Hold?
The Booker decision was the first step in the realization that mechanical
statistically based sentencing systems, with the primary goal of consistency, cannot work
in a society based on individuality. Mr. Natale shows the injustice that is inherent
throughout such a system. I am not calling for a complete return to indeterminate
sentencing. Sentencing guidelines can be an excellent tool if they are used correctly and
are developed using the wealth of knowledge that has amassed in our judicial system.
The opportunity is here for the creation of an enlightened system that accomplishes all of
the goals of punishment as effectively as possible. Such a system could bring fairness
and legitimacy back to sentencing.
A. Bring Back Parole
Although the original parole system was flawed, in theory, its purpose was to
make an individualized assessment of the needs of each inmate and allow for release only
when rehabilitation was complete.130 Not only was this a valuable tool for managing the
prison population and returning offenders to society, but it created incentive among
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offenders to rehab themselves in hope of being released.131 The old system, however,
was unwieldy and lacked effective guidance.132 A more controlled version of parole can
offer significant benefits in the post Booker sentencing world.133 Revamped parole
guidelines could allow for a more consistent and controlled front end of sentencing, with
discretion moved to the back end where it is toughest to predict outcomes at the time of
sentencing.134 As an example of the confidence in parole, notwithstanding the federal
system, discretionary parole remains the most common approach to sentencing used in
the United States.135 In order to control a new system of parole, new sentencing
guidelines would include a system of guidelines designed specifically for parole.136 A
parole system would be beneficial in alleviating the problems inherent in housing older,
non-violent, first time offenders such as Mr. Natale. Older offenders usually present little
chance of re-offending yet cost the prison system an exorbitant amount of money each
year they age within the system.137 Parole standards could be established that would
mandate review upon a certain age and amount of time served, leaving the discretion as
to release to a qualified reviewing body.138 A new and improved Federal parole system
would be beneficial to society as a whole by adding another check to the sentencing
system to ensure that sentences are fair and effective. Discretionary parole would also
help reduce the costs from an overflowing and aging federal prison population.
131
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B. New Guidelines
“Congress and the commission can do better this time if they attend more closely
to the overt functions the sentencing machinery is expected to perform and if they restrain
themselves from use of sentencing and sentencing reform to pursue latent goals only
incidentally related, or unrelated, to imposition of just and appropriately preventive
punishments.”139 The new guidelines should be mandatory not advisory, and they should
bind judges in a similar fashion as higher court precedents, thus when there is a
reasonable distinguishable case, the judge should be able to exercise discretion.140
Statistics could be used to provide judges with guidance as to how similar defendants are
being sentenced around the nation. Another necessity of a new guidelines system is that
it not be overly complex and that it have far fewer, but larger ranges. For example,
Minnesota has ten ranges, compared to the federal system’s forty three.141 Wider ranges
will give the judge an appropriate level of discretion. The new guidelines must also
encourage departures from the guidelines to “accommodate cases of greater and lesser
seriousness.”142 The guidelines must allow consideration of characteristics of the
defendant as a person including things such as age, education, and family and community
ties, and non violent offenders, factors which are now prohibited.143 Real offense
sentencing or relevant conduct mandatory sentencing should be eliminated from any
future guidelines as they are a clear violation of several constitutional rights.144 Less
complex guidelines that take into account individual characteristics of offenders and that
139
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prohibit real offense sentencing would likely return the discretionary power in sentencing
to judges, removing it from the hands of prosecutors and probation officers. New
guidelines should also attempt to better meet an initial mandate of the sentencing reform
act – to limit overpopulation of federal prisons.145 Sentencing reform would also benefit
from a reevaluation of the sentencing commission, ensuring that it does not rely too
heavily on statistical outcomes and also ensuring that it is mandated to use the expertise
of federal judges by working directly with the judiciary.146
The new guidelines must better incorporate the concepts of rehabilitation and
non-prison alternatives. Home confinement, drug rehab confinement, community
service, mandatory restitution, and others are considered to affect recidivism just as
equally as prison and may be more beneficial to society.147 In fact, studies have shown
the effectiveness of a large number of treatment programs.148 Programs such as anger
management, cognitive skills, sex-offender treatment, as well as vocational training have
been shown to reduce recidivism.149 Some other considerations should be elimination of
sentence appeal waivers, better data analysis and release, and encouragement of more
detailed sentence explanation by judges.150
Most importantly, as professor Tonry stated in a recent article, “overly rigid,
overly detailed guidelines do not work well. Experience with state guidelines shows that
guidelines can at the same time provide meaningful guidance on appropriate sentences
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for typical cases while allowing judges and counsel sufficient flexibility to adjust
sentences to take account of particular ethically relevant circumstances in individual
cases.”151 As an experiment, I sentenced Mr. Natale under the Minnesota Guidelines. In
doing so I found that not only would the sentence have been significantly less severe with
a presumptive sentence of seven years, the judge would have had a reasonable amount of
discretion to move up or down from the presumptive sentence, and encouragement to
depart even further when necessary.152 Working with the Minnesota system is simple and
intuitive, providing meaningful guidance without being overly restrictive. The Federal
system could benefit significantly by following in the footsteps of Minnesota and many
other states that have effective sentencing guidelines.
C. Stop Mandatory Minimums
Mandatory minimum sentences and related topless sentences are unaffected by
Booker and are some of the harshest and the most unenlightened forms of sentencing
available.153 Mandatory minimums, like the Guidelines, are overly severe and rigid and
are in conflict with the goals of justice, consistency, and discretion that are necessary in a
sentencing system.154 The continued use of mandatory minimums runs contrary to all of
the goals laid out in this article. Mandatory minimums suffer from the same problem as
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the Guidelines, heavy reliance on the least possible information about a defendant.155 For
example, in drug cases the only factor used for application of the mandatory minimum is
drug quantity, no other factor is even considered.156 The most recognized failure of
reliance on only one factor has been termed the “cliff effect.” Defendants who have a
quantity of drugs only slightly below the cut off quantity for the mandatory minimum
sentence are sentenced at significantly lower levels then those with quantities only
slightly above.157 The path is familiar, this harsh, rigid, unintuitive scheme leads to
disparity, unfairness, and circumvention through excessive plea deals - many of the same
problems found in the Guidelines. The problem with mandatory minimums is best
summed up in a speech by George Bush senior in 1970 introducing a bill to eliminate
mandatory minimums.
“Contrary to what one might imagine, however, [eliminating mandatory
minimums] will result in better justice and more appropriate sentences.
For one thing, Federal judges are almost unanimously opposed to
mandatory minimums, because they remove a great deal of the court’s
discretion….this is particularly true in cases where addict possessors
who sell to support their habits are involved, and a great deal of plea
bargaining in this area results…..Philosophical differences aside,
practicality requires a sentence structure which is generally acceptable to
the courts, to prosecutors, and to the general public.”158
Conclusion
During the past decade the prison population in America has more than doubled
and is substantially higher than any other nation in the world.159 Non-violent crimes such
as drug crimes result in more severe sentences than sexual abuse, manslaughter, and
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assault.160 In a Federal Courts Study during the 1990s, out of 270 witnesses, 266 voted
against the Guidelines and their focus on severity and rigidity, all of them judges, the four
in favor were three sentencing commissioners and the Attorney General.161 In general,
large segments of the legal community have expressed disgust with the harsh mechanical
nature of the Guidelines and similar systems.162 One would think that the large outcry
from the academic community and the judiciary would quell this desire for consistency,
but a recent speech by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales was rife with all the same
buzz words and concepts and called for a system of mandatory minimum topless
guidelines.163 One statistic in particular stands out as showing that the guidelines are not
in line with what society considers fair punishment. The average time served under the
Guidelines is more than twice that served for a pre-guidelines sentence.164 The average
sentences of all the sentencing judges would seem to show a judicial consensus as to
what our judges and thus society consider to be adequate. Doubling this number is
clearly a forced increase above the societal norm. And even worse, a defendant who as
Mr. Natale did, decides to go to trial, on average will have their sentence doubled.165 Not
only is this contrary to judicial norms, but studies have shown that the punishment under
rigid systems or mandatory minimums are more severe than the general public would call
for.166
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The federal obsession with disparity has been called pathological and is unwise
given the clear lack of understanding as to what disparity actually means.167 The average
objective person would consider it unjust if “they or a family member received a long
prison sentence not because the offense inherently warranted it but because a law
requiring that sentence was enacted for reasons having nothing to do with just
punishment or crime control.”168 Injustice in the case of Mr. Natale, or in any one case,
cannot be ignored even if it is a statistical anomaly. Every single instance of injustice is a
deprivation of the liberties guaranteed by our Constitution.

Any future action by

congress aimed at correcting sentencing must abandon the obsession with disparity and
focus on culpability. Disparity in sentencing will never be eliminated, and focusing on
disparity as the prime goal of sentencing results in various forms of injustice. Rendering
the guidelines advisory under Booker is a step in the right direction, but “no matter how
much weight is given to the Sentencing Guidelines and how often judges follow them,
they are still the same deeply flawed Guidelines.”169 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
built around statistical consistency, had a ripple effect that molded the entire sentencing
process in its wake. Our experience with such a system demonstrates that we must
follow a different path into the future and although Booker is a positive step, alone it is
not enough to cure the deep rooted flaws in the Federal sentencing system.
In the end, it is people like Roberto Natale who are suffering the consequences of
the desire for consistency and severity in sentencing. I felt it was only fitting to end with
his view on sentencing.
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“I felt like a baby lamb surrounded by a pack of wolves. Everything was stacked
against me, the government, they do these cases every day, they had control. I went in
[to sentencing], and was supposed to get 5-10 years, and I could maybe accept that, even
though this evidence against me, it was all from other guilty people. You think they
would look at that, that the evidence was not strong, that I had a clean record, that I was a
good person and that for years I had not been involved with these people, that my
education was not good, that I was going to be so old when I got out. You think these
would be things that would help me, but instead they say I am a manager. Out of
nowhere I get double time, all from [government facts], there was no trial and they add
on all that time. Everyone knew it then, that the new law (the guidelines) was not fair,
and I saw why, it was a show, to give the [prosecutors] control, to make examples of
people like me, with low education and everything against me. It was not fair, and I
didn’t know how to express it then because I was scared of going to jail, and now these
cases (booker) say that what happened to me is not fair. But it continues to be a show,
these cases are no help to me, they admit my rights are violated, but I still have to deal
with it. But it is done now, I have accepted it, I just want to make sure it doesn’t happen
again, to anyone else.”170
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